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"Humanae Vitae" and the 
Principle of Totality 
Ralph Mcinerny 
The ali/hor. the Michael P. Grace ProFessor of Medieval Studies at the 
Unil 'ersity of" No tre Dame. presented this paper at the 2nd International 
ConFerence on Moral Theology in Rome in November. 1988. 
Putamus nostrae aetatis 
homines aptissimos esse ad 
perspiciendum , quam haec 
doctrina sit humanae rationi 
consentanea . (HV, n. 12) 
Pope Paul VI's prediction 10 "Humanae Vitae" that his 
contemporaries were pa rticularly well disposed to see that the 
inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act 
precludes contraception has not, in the short term, been borne out, at 
least if one is guided by the amplified voices of dissenters . It is ironic that 
a general confidence in people of our day should have had so fragile a 
basis among so me of the faithful themselves , even those to whom the 
Church has entrusted the teaching of moral theology. It was precisely to 
this insepara ble connection between the unitive and procreative 
meanings of the conjugal act that Cardinal Ratzinger appealed in the 
" Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity 
of Procreation". Many have noted the symmetry between " Humanae 
Vitae" and the "Instruction on Respect for Life". It is the same principle 
that forbids separately the unitive from the procreative meanings in 
contraceptive sex and the separating of the procreative from the unitive 
in homologous artificial fertilization. 
In this paper, after reflecting on that principle, I want to consider 
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the objection to it , based on the so-called "principle of totality", a 
symmetrical form of which has surfaced in reaction to the "Instruction on 
Respect for Life". 
I. Unitive and Procreative Meanings 
The second part of "Humanae Vitae" running from n. 7 through 18 is 
called, in one English translation, Doctrinal Principles. The Holy Father 
urges a proper understanding of the nature of the conjugal act, on the one 
had, and of responsible parenthood , on the other, since these have been 
appealed to on behalf of behavior traditionally regarded as immoral. 
Quocirca per mutuam sui 
donationem, quae ipso rum propria 
est et exclusoria, coniuges 
illam persequuntur personarum 
communionem. qua se invicem 
perficiant . ut ad novorum 
viventium procreationem et 
educationem cum Deo operam 
sociant. (HV. n. 8) 
By means of the reciprocal 
personal gift which is pro per 
and exclusive to them. husband 
and wife tend toward that 
communion of their beings 
whereby they help each other 
toward personal perfection in 
order to collaborate with God 
in the begetting and rearing. of 
new lives. (Ca legari tra ns. ) 
This understanding of the marriage act is taken to be that which all men 
should have on the basis of natural reason. Pius VI then added that for 
baptized persons marriage takes on the dignity of a sacramental sign of 
grace and represents the union of Christ and the Church. 
The characteristics and demands of spousal love which the encyclical 
then develops are four. It is human, that is, a love both sensible and 
spiritual. As a human act , spousal love is an act of deliberative will 
bearing on the use of our bodies in such a way as to promote an enduring 
union between man and wife and their mutual attainment of human 
perfection . It is a total and mutual giving of self, faithful and exclusive 
until death, which by its very nature is fruitful , ordered to bring new lives 
into existence. 
Clearly this is a description of this human act as it ought to be , but 
these demands are exigencies of the act itself; it is am oral ideal that can 
and should be realized ; that is, it is the measure of each instance of such 
activity . The doctrine of the encyclical is sometimes described as an 
"ideal" which should be acknowledged, but apparently not as one that 
can and should be realized . This kind of acceptance of"Humanae Vitae" 
as the expression of an unrealizable ideal which should nonetheless gain 
our assent is, of course, a rejection of and dissent from it. To characterize 
practical advice as in effect impractical is a somewhat Pickwickian way to 
praise it, let alone accept it. 
Paul VI's remarks about responsible parenthood continue to develop a 
moral ideal on the basis of the nature of spousal love as human action . 
"Quoniam humana ratio in facultate vitae procreandae biologicas 
deprehendit leges, quae ad humanam personam pertinent: the intellect 
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discovers in the power of giving life biological laws that are part of the 
human person." (n. 10) The reference here is to the "Summa theologiae", 
Ia IIae, q. 94, a . 2, where practical reason's judgment concerning the 
pursuit of the goods which are the object of natural inclinations are called 
the first principles of natural law. The biological laws are not themselves 
precepts of natural law, needless to say. Practical reason directs acts of 
deliberate will which bear on the ends of natural inclinations. 
Porro ea, de qua loquimur, 
conscia paternitas praecipue 
aliam eamque intimam secum fert 
rationem, pertinentem ad ordinem 
moraiem. quem obiectivum vocant, 
a Deoque statutum, cuius recta 
conscientia est vera interpres. 
Quapropter paternitatis consciae 
munus id postulat , ut coniuges 
sua officia erga Deum, erga 
seipsos. erga familiam. erga 
humanam societatem agnoscant, 
rerum bonorumque ordine recte 
servato. (HY. n. 10 in fine) 
Responsible parenthood also and 
above all implies a more 
profound relationship to the 
objective moral order 
established by God, and of 
which a right conscience is the 
faithful interpreter. The 
responsible exercise of 
parenthood implies , therefore, 
that spouses recognize fully 
their duties toward God , toward 
themselves , toward the family 
and society, in a correct 
hierarchy of va lues. 
It is against this background that Paul VI says that the Church is calling 
men back to the observance of the norms of natural law when she says 
that each and every conjugal act must remain open to the transmission of 
life. (HV, n. II) 
Humanly to engage in sexual activity is to respect the end and purpose 
of the activity engaged in and to relate it to the total good of the person, 
the marriage, the family, society, God. The conjugal act, sexual activity 
as engaged in by responsible human agents, both unites the partners and 
enables them to generate new life. 
Quodsi utraque eiusmodi 
essential is ratio, unitatis 
videlicet et procreationis, 
servatur, usus matrimonii sensum 
mutui verique amoris suumque 
ordinem ad celsissimum 
paternita tis munus omnino 
retinet. ad quod homo vocatur. 
(HY, n. 12) 
By safeguarding both these 
essential aspects, the unitive 
and the procreative, the 
conjugal act preserves in its 
fullness the sense of mutual 
love and its orientation to 
man's most high vocation to 
parenthood. 
It is the profoundly reasonable and human character of this principle 
that , to return to my beginning, caused the Holy Father to think that men 
nowadays were particularly capable of confirming it. Why? Because of 
our readiness to see that for one spouse to force the conjugal act on the 
other without regard to particular circumstances and desires is no act of 
love and is in fact "a denial of the right moral order in the relations 
between spouses." A forced act of mutual giving meant to enhance 
personal union as well as transmit life is a contradiction of the act, not an 
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instance of it. The Pope's assumption that this would be readily seen does 
not seem overly optimistic. So he goes on. 
Pariter, si rem considerent, 
fateantur oportet, actum amoris 
mutui, qui facultati vitam 
propagandi detrimento sit, quam 
Deus omnium Creator secundum 
peculia res leges in ea 
insculpsit, refragari tum divino 
consilio, ad cuius normam 
coniugium constitutum est, tum 
voluntati primae vitae humanae 
Auctoris. (HY, n. 13) 
By parity of reasoning, one who 
reflects carefully must also 
recognize that an act of mutual 
love that prejudices the 
capacity to transmit life that 
God the Creator, according to 
particular laws inserted 
therein is in contradiction 
with the design constitutive 
of marriage and with the will 
of the Author of Life. 
What is the argument? The umtIve and procreative meanings of the 
conjugal act are inseparable from it. A forced conjugal act destroys the 
unitive meaning; contraception destroys the procreative meaning. 
Neither is an appropriate instance of the act; both are negations of the 
nature of the act. That is what Pope Paul VI thought men of our day are 
particularly ready to accept. 
II. The Principle of Totality 
When at the outset of "Humanae Vitae" Paul VI lists some of the 
reasons why it was thought necessary to take a new look at the traditional 
Church teaching on marriage, reasons he states with fairness and 
sympathy, he identifies one putative basis for reconsideration as based on 
the principle of totality. 
An praeterea, principio 
totalitatis, quod appellant, in 
hac re adhibito, non liceat 
arbitrari consilium fecunditatis 
minus uberis, sed magis rationi 
consentaneae, posse act urn, 
physice sterilitatem afferentem, 
in licitam providamque gignendae 
prolis moderationem vertere. An 
videlicet fas non sit opinari 
finem procreandae prolis potius 
ad totam coniugum vitam, quam ad 
singulos quosque eius actus 
pertinere. (HY, n. 3) 
Or else, by extending to this 
field the application of the so-
called 'principle of 
totality; could one not admit 
that the intention or a less 
abundant but more rationally 
controlled fertility transforms 
a materially sterilizing 
intervention into a permissible 
and wise control of births? 
Could one not admit, in other 
words, that the procreative 
finality pertains to conjugal 
life taken as a whole, rather 
than to its single acts? 
Not only does the encyclical cite this argument, it responds to it. 
Nonetheless, dissenters sometimes invoked it as if the Pope had 
overlooked it.2 It underscores the symmetry of"Humanae Vitae" and the 
"Instruction on Respect for Life", that the principle of totality should be 
invoked in dissenting from the latter to suggest that a couple's having 
recourse to homologous artificial fertilization can be justified if attention 
is paid to the whole story of their life together. 
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There is, I would say, good reason to consider contraception, IVF and AIH as 
capable of enhancing the natural course of a marital life in the same way that a 
caesarean section and bottle-feeding with special supplements do. There can be 
artifice and technology that enhance nature. But that needs to be evaluated within 
the full continuity and integrity of a couple's sexual life. The moral worth of 
technical intervention would derive from whether the union itself was generous 
between the spouses and toward offspring."' 
Prof. Oliver O'Donovan of Oxford objected that in "Humanae Vitae", 
"Chastity in marriage was analyzed into a series of particular acts of 
sexual union, a proceeding which carried with it an unwitting but 
unmistakable hint of the pornographic." Since Burtchaell cites 
O'Donovan at some length, it can be assumed that what the Oxonian has 
to say of "Humanae Vitae" as well as of the "Instruction on Respect for 
Life" is considered a high example of the defense of the principle of 
totality. 
A married couple do not know each other in isolated moments or one-night 
stands. Their moments of sexual union are points of focus for a physical 
relationship which must properly be predicated of the whole extent of their life 
together. Thus. the virtue of chastity as openness to procreation cannot be 
accounted for in terms of a repeated sequence of chaste acts, each of which is 
open to procreation. The chastity of a couple is more than the chastity of their 
acts, though it is not irrespective of it either4 
Burtchaell and O'Donovan provide us with fairly recent statements of the 
way the principle of totality is invoked to justify what the Church 
condemns. I find a very curious theory of action lurking behind their 
remarks and I think it will be useful to bring it out into the open, the more 
so because it seems to me that the principle the two men invoke provides a 
very feeble defense of what they have set out to champion .5 
How does "Humanae Vitae" reply to the argument based on the 
principle of totality? Reconsideration has led the Holy Father to declare 
once again that "cum quis dono Dei utitur, tollens, licet solum ex parte, 
significationem et finem doni ipsius , sive viri sive mulieris naturae 
repugnant eorumque intimae necessitudini, ac propterea etiam Dei 
consilio sanctaeque eius voluntati obnititur: those who make use of this 
divine gift while destroying it, even if only partially, its significance and its 
finality, act contrary to the nature of both man and woman and of their 
most intimate relationship, and therefore contradict also the plan of God 
and his wilL" (n . 13) Given this judgment, following on the very nature of 
the conjugal act, the dismissal of the argument for contraception based on 
the principle of totality is inevitable . 
Neljue vero. ad eos coniugales 
actus comprobandos ex industria 
fecund itate privatos. haec 
argumcnta ut va lida affcrrc 
02 
And to justify conjugal acts 
made intentionally infertile 
one cannot in\'oke as valid 
reasons the lesse r ev il. or the 
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licet: nempe, id malum elegendum 
esse, quod minus grave videatur; 
insuper eosdem actus in unum 
quoddam coalescere cum actibus 
fecundis iam antea positis vel 
postea ponendis, atque adeo 
horum unam atque parem moralem 
bonitatem participare. Verum 
enimvero, si malum morale 
tolerare, quod minus grave sit , 
interdum licet, ut aliquod maius 
vitetur malum vel aliquod 
praestantius [bonum promoveatur, 
numquam tamen licet, ne ob 
gravissimas quidem caucas, 
facere mala ut eveniant bona ... 
(HV, n. 14) 
fact that when taken together 
with the fertile acts already 
performed or to follow later, 
such acts would coalesce into a 
whole and hence would share in 
one and the same moral 
goodness. In truth, if it is 
sometimes permissible to 
tolerate a lesser moral evil in 
order to avoid a greater evil 
or to promote a greater good, 
it is not permissible, not even 
for the gravest reasons, to do 
evil so that good may follow 
therefrom. 
Paul VI must, of course, view the argument drawn from totality as 
violating the principle that evil may not be done that good might come. A 
conjugal act so engaged in that it is directly rendered infertile is a denial of 
one of the very meanings of the act - its procreative signification. As such, 
contraceptive sex is morally wrong. To engage in contraceptive sex on the 
assumption that good things will thereby come about for the couple and 
their family is to do an evil that good may come. 
Those who dispute this do not, of course, want to allow that the 
contraceptive act is immoral. To avoid this, they suggest another way of 
appraising actions, not one at a time, but as elements in a moral unity 
which is the whole marriage. O'Donovan agrees that without 
subordination to the couple's quest for fruitfulness in their union, 
homologous artificial fertilization would be an offensive act. By parity of 
reasoning, presumably, the contraceptive act would have to be 
subordiriate to the couple's quest for union. Or perhaps in either case the 
subordination is to the couple's quest for union and fruitfulness. The point 
of the dissent in any case is that the act taken singly has no moral value. 
This must be distinguished from the tack taken by Burtchaell in the 
passage quoted above, where contraception, IFH, AIH, caesarean 
sections and bottle-feeding were lumped together as all involving artifice 
and technology. It is, of course, disingenuous to read the Instruction as 
expressive of a Luddite distrust for technology, since it goes out of its way 
to make clear that is not the point.6 Despite this lapse on Burtchaell's part 
as to what the principle of totality is taken to justify (surely the questions 
raised about contraception and homologous artificial fertilization are not 
raised about caesarean sections and bottle feeding), his statement of the 
principle is helpful. "The moral worth of technical intervention would 
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derive from w.hetheL the _union.itself was,generous between the. spouses . 
and toward offspring."7 
Kierkegaard contrasted what he called the aesthetic sphere, symbolized 
by the seducer, and the ethical sphere, symbolized by the husband, 
The former is episodic, the repetition of moments, the same damned 
thing over and over; this note of the aesthetic is captured by Leporello's 
aria in "Don Giovanni", citing his master's conquests ----; one thousand 
and three in Spain alone! The ethical, on the other hand, involves the 
acquiring of a history by surmounting the moment and developing a life. 
Those who invoke the principle of totality remind us that marriage is a 
pact meant to last a lifetime, that the spouses enter into it with an eye to 
the long haul, pledging their love until death do them part. A marriage is 
thus a mutual effort to acquire a character, to do well a work that neither 
spouse can do alone. The marriage is somehow a whole that is greater 
than its parts and it is the whole which confers moral value on the parts, 
not the other way around. 
The theory was not invented ad hoc to discuss marriage. It is a theory 
about the moral life as such seemingly reminiscent of Aristotle's, "One 
swallow does not make a spring." One good action does not give us a 
good character; and of course when virtue is had, a good character 
gained, it is a cause of further good acts, not simply their effect. The 
attractiveness of the appeal to totality, then, is that it calls attention to 
features of the moral life which have long been recognized. It seems clear 
that those who invoke it have in mind such home truths as that a human 
life does not consist of a single episode, that the moral life is a task over 
time in which a history is acquired and we become the kind of person we 
morally are. 
Nonetheless, the principle of totality seems to me to be quite different 
from the tradition it apparently evokes, a sign of which is that neither a 
Kierkegaard nor an Aristotle would have accepted the theory of action 
thought to be implied by the principle of totality. 8 Kierkegaard's notion 
that the ethical life is the acquisition of a history never leads him to 
suggest that the acts making it up should be, on the average, good . No 
more does Aristotle, insofar as he distinguishes between a good action 
and a good character, think that actions taken one at a time cannot be 
morally appraised, Surely the goodness or badness ofthe moral life taken 
as a whole is essentially dependent on the goodness or badness of the acts 
which make it up. If this is so, it cannot be the case that the individual acts 
are what they are morally because they are components of a good life. 
Surely when we say of someone that he has lived a good life, we are 
speaking of the constituent acts of his life. The life is good because the 
acts which make it up are good, not the other way around. 
The proponents of the principle of totality would not want to 
countenance an act of marital infidelity by saying that when absorbed 
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into the marriage taken as a whole, it loses its negative note. Yet they seem 
to invite such an appeal.9 Say it is a single lapse. Our attitude toward the 
unfaithful partner would be a good deal different than it would be if such 
infidelity were frequent; the one time adulterer is not as bad as the married 
philanderer. True as that is, it in no way alters the fact that the act of 
adultery as such is morally wrong. One sin does not make a vicious person 
anymore than one good act makes one virtuous. But it is single acts which 
are the primary carriers of moral quality and are good or bad. Perhaps what 
misleads here is confusing habits or character and acts. One must have a 
track record of a certain kind before we account him courageous or just. But 
he will acquire the desired character by means of acts of a certain moral 
kind.1O 
The conceptual question facing the proponents of the principle of 
totality, then, seems unanswerable. How can a plurality of acts have a 
moral character denied to each of them taken singly? To speak of single 
acts as episodes suggests that they can have no moral value as such. But if 
they cannot, neither can the life of which they form parts. The married 
life of a couple may ideed in the main be made up of morally good 
conjugal acts, but this provides no basis for saying that this contraceptive 
conjugal act is not bad. To say that it is good because it is an episode in a 
good life will entail denying that the single act of adultery is wrong. We 
may have to wait years before we can confidently say that the spouses 
have a good married life, but in the meantime they must act and the deeds 
they do must meet presently applicable moral standards. On the basis of 
the dissenters' appeal to the principle of totality, "Make me chaste, Lord, 
but not yet," could become an exculpating principle of universal 
application. 
Those who dissent from "Humanae Vitae" on the basis of the principle 
of totality have, in fact, no basis for dissent. They admit that the life of the 
spouses will be morally good only if it is one of generosity toward one 
another and toward offspring, and this seems an acceptance of the unitive 
and procreative meanings as essential to married life taken as a whole. 
But if these two meanings can only be honored in singular acts, on which 
basis the married life taken as a whole is said derivatively to honor them, 
it is in singular acts that the moral significance of the spouses' life will lie. 
The principle of totality cannot ground the claim that singular acts 
which, taken as such, are offensive, cease to be so when considered in the 
light of the moral life taken as a whole. The moral imperative is not that 
we should act well more often than not. Rather it is: Do good and avoid 
evil. 
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